China Taiwan Military Drills: PLA Launches Largest Exercises in a Decade

On 8 April 2023, China's People's Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command began three days of joint military exercises around Taiwan that defence analysts described as the largest in at least a decade. The trigger was a meeting four days earlier in California between Taiwan's then-president Tsai Ing-wen and Kevin McCarthy, who was speaker of the US House of Representatives at the time. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence counted 71 Chinese military aircraft and 9 naval vessels near the island in the first 24 hours. The aircraft carrier Shandong took part, along with J-16 fighter jets and H-6 bombers. By the time the drills ended on 10 April, the PLA had simulated strikes on Taiwan's key ports and airfields and had encircled the island from the north, south, east, and west for the first time since the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis.

I'll confess now that for years I thought PLA stood for polylactic acid, the material used in compostable forks. That confusion never mattered in public health. It matters a great deal when you are trying to explain why a Chinese carrier group is conducting live-fire exercises 90 nautical miles from Taipei and your brain keeps picturing disposable cutlery. So let me get the acronym straight here: People's Liberation Army. The forks, as far as I can tell, are not part of the blockade.

What the April 2023 drills actually did

The exercise, which Beijing later folded into the "Joint Sword" series, combined naval, air, missile, and coast guard units in a way that went well beyond the show-of-force drills the PLA had held after Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan eight months earlier. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence tracked the Shandong carrier group operating east of Taiwan while fighter jets and bombers approached from the north, south, and west. China's military also declared "no-fly" and "no-sail" zones in the Taiwan Strait and around the island's principal shipping lanes.

The part that got less attention than the aircraft count was the blockade simulation. Instead of merely flying jets near Taiwan's air defence identification zone, the PLA rehearsed cutting off access to Taiwan's major ports and sea lanes. That matters because Taiwan imports nearly all of its energy and a significant share of its food by sea. The exercise also included live-fire missile launches into waters east and west of Taiwan, according to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence. The aircraft types identified included J-16 multirole fighters and H-6 bombers, the same platforms Beijing has used in regular incursions into Taiwan's air defence identification zone.

• J-16 fighter jets flying from bases in mainland China
• H-6 bombers conducting simulated standoff strikes
• Shandong carrier group operating east of Taiwan
• Coastal missile batteries conducting live-fire launches
• Coast guard cutters patrolling the Taiwan Strait

Taiwan's air defence identification zone has been a flashpoint since 2020, when PLA aircraft began crossing the Taiwan Strait median line with growing frequency. The April 2023 exercise took that pressure and compressed it into three days of continuous operations. Taiwan's own fighter jets were scrambled repeatedly, and the island's air defence network remained at high readiness throughout.

Why this round was different

The scale of the April 2023 exercise was not just about the number of aircraft. Previous post-1996 drills had been large in one domain, usually air or missile. This one put an aircraft carrier battle group, coastal missile batteries, fighter jets, and coast guard cutters in the same operational picture. The Shandong's position east of Taiwan meant the PLA could rehearse attacking from the direction where Taiwan's defences have historically been weakest. That detail changed how military planners in Taiwan and Washington read the exercise.

China's official statements called the drills a "stern warning" against "collusion" between Taiwan and the United States. Taiwan's government called them irresponsible and said they undermined regional stability. The United States Indo-Pacific Command said it was monitoring the situation and remained committed to Taiwan's self-defence under the Taiwan Relations Act. Japan, which has its own territorial disputes with China near the Senkaku Islands, said it was watching closely because some Chinese vessels operated in waters near Japan's southwestern islands.

The reaction from Taiwan, the United States, and others

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence scrambled fighter jets, deployed naval vessels, and put coastal missile batteries on alert. The ministry's English-language news releases, which are available on its website, described the PLA activity as "irresponsible" and warned that Beijing was using military coercion to intimidate Taiwan's 23 million people. The United States State Department called the drills "provocative" and reiterated that Washington would help Taiwan maintain a sufficient self-defence capability. Japan's defence ministry issued similar concerns, noting that some Chinese naval vessels operated in waters close to Japan's southwestern islands near Okinawa.

European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said the bloc opposed any unilateral change to the status quo by force. Australia and South Korea also expressed concern. The collective response was notably measured: no side threatened direct military action, but every major player in the region moved naval or air assets to monitor the exercise more closely. That measured response itself told a story. After decades of treating cross-strait tensions as a diplomatic problem, the April 2023 drills forced regional militaries to treat the PLA's Taiwan operations as a standing operational fact. You can read the official statements on Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence English news releases.

The drills that followed in 2024

Beijing did not stop after April 2023. In May 2024, days after Lai Ching-te was inaugurated as Taiwan's president, the PLA launched "Joint Sword-2024A," a two-day exercise that again encircled Taiwan and included fighter jets, drones, warships, and coast guard vessels. In October 2024, after Lai's National Day speech, the PLA mounted "Joint Sword-2024B," which simulated a blockade of Taiwan's key ports and included the aircraft carrier Liaoning operating east of the island. Reuters' Asia-Pacific coverage has documented both exercises extensively, describing them as rehearsals for a possible quarantine or blockade of Taiwan.

These drills have become routine enough that Taiwan's defence ministry now publishes daily updates on PLA aircraft and vessel movements in its air defence identification zone. The October 2024 exercise was notable for involving coast guard ships from China's maritime law enforcement agencies, not just the military. That blurred the line between law enforcement and military action in a way that makes it harder for foreign governments to decide how to respond.

What this means for people who live there

The drills rarely cause direct harm to civilians, but they do disrupt ordinary life. Commercial airlines reroute flights to avoid the exercise zones, adding time and cost to routes between Asia and North America. Shipping companies face higher insurance premiums when transiting near Taiwan, and Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration has issued temporary flight restrictions during previous exercises. Fishermen in the Taiwan Strait receive radio warnings to leave certain areas, and some have reported harassment by Chinese coast guard vessels. During the April 2023 exercise, at least two international airlines filed revised flight paths to avoid the designated zones, according to regional aviation notices.

The psychological effect is harder to measure but no less real. Taipei residents have become accustomed to seeing PLA aircraft on radar and hearing air raid sirens during annual defence drills. The April 2023 exercise was different in scale, and many people remember where they were when the live-fire missiles landed in the water. That kind of memory builds over time. The line between a drill and an actual attack is not always obvious from the ground, and that ambiguity is part of the pressure Beijing wants to apply.

The risk of miscalculation

Military exercises are supposed to be predictable, but the Taiwan Strait has no direct military-to-military communication channel between Beijing and Taipei. When two sides run large live-fire operations in overlapping areas, the chance of an accident rises. In the South China Sea, where similar tensions exist, our earlier coverage of a naval standoff showed how quickly a routine patrol can become a diplomatic incident. The difference in the Taiwan Strait is the absence of any agreed crisis-management mechanism. The Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder on China-Taiwan tensions explains why this absence matters more than any single exercise.

Both Beijing and Taipei have rules of engagement that are meant to prevent first shots, but rules only work if everyone interprets signals the same way. A fighter jet that enters disputed airspace by mistake could be met by missiles before anyone has time to clarify intent. The April 2023 drills demonstrated that the PLA is willing to operate very close to Taiwan's coast, and Taiwan's military is willing to shadow those operations. That is not a stable equilibrium.

What to watch next

The next major trigger will likely be a high-level contact between Taiwan and the United States, or a political event on the island that Beijing interprets as a step toward formal independence. Taiwan's next presidential election is scheduled for 2028, but lower-profile events can also set off exercises. The October 2024 drills showed that even a speech can be enough. Beijing has also linked its military pressure to arms sales the United States makes to Taiwan, so any new weapons package will be followed closely.

For now, the PLA's pattern is to hold large exercises after political events, then return to a lower level of daily incursions. The baseline of those daily incursions has risen steadily since 2020. What was once a rare event is now a standing feature of the region's security environment. And that, more than any single exercise, is the real change. The largest drills in a decade are no longer an anomaly; they are the new yardstick against which the next exercise will be measured.

So when I see PLA now, I still think of forks. But at least I know which fork is pointing at Taiwan, and I understand why everyone else is watching it so closely.

Photo by K.T. Francis on Unsplash